Administrative Law - Problem Child by Prettyman, E. Barrett
Denver Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 9 Article 4 
June 2021 
Administrative Law - Problem Child 
E. Barrett Prettyman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
E. Barrett Prettyman, Administrative Law - Problem Child, 25 Dicta 213 (1948). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DICTA
Administrative Law-Problem Child
By the HON. E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN
Associate Justice, U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. Reprinted by permission from the Journal of the Bar Associa-
tion of the District of Columbia, June 1947.
Your chairman's generous reference to the happenstance that this Section
was conceived during the year of my turn as president of the Association,
gives the reason for my place on this program. Some recognition was due the
venerable putative progenitor of the present lusty outfit. As a further pre,
liminary, I take it that we all understand that nothing that I may say has
the slightest relation to my position on the bench. I am not, of course, speak,
ing for the court, and I shall say nothing in any official capacity. My interest
here is that of a retired fellow practitioner and a former administrative official,
concerned in the problems which we all have and in which we take such
great delight.
We are in the midst, perhaps in the precise crisis, of the development of a
great field of law. It is not too great exaggeration to say that the development
of administrative law is akin to the development of equity in importance.
That development poses problems.
I have a very simple thesis to present. It is that there are vital problems
of a procedural nature in the field of administrative law, -that they are best
solved by a cooperative effort of the agencies and the bar, and that yours is the
organization which ought to lead the way.
Let us state some premises. They are trite. The administrative agencies
are essential features of a government designed and equipped to govern a
complex economic society. They are, therefore, permanent. So it is idle to
rebel against them or to protest their existence. To be a little more direct, or
perhaps we might say "earthy", about it, the administrative practitioner should
be the last of all humans to complain at the fact of administrative agencies.
His concern should be for perfection of the system and hence its more cer-
tain perpetuation and expansion. We discuss the problems, not in criticism
but constructively as subjects of interest, both theoretical and directly practical.
We do have problems. Some of them are procedural. I have said that
they are vital. Too many people in the administrative field say that merely
procedural matters are of little importance. They are wholly wrong. In the
first place, many things which our people hold most precious are procedural.
Due process of law is one. Trial by jury is another. A search warrant is an-
other. Ceremonies are merely procedural, but some of them, such as taking
an oath of office, or getting married, are pretty important.
Not only is that so, but a major part of the public appraisal of govern-
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ment activity is based on procedural considerations. If a judge proceeds with
care and deliberation, in calm order, people generally trust him. When stress
comes they support him. If a judge is impatient, disorderly, uncertain, people.
generally do not believe in him as a judge, even if his answers on substantive
matters are right. Curtis Bok, in his "I too, Nicodemus", says that impatient
judges ought to be impeached. It is true in all phases of life. If the clerks in
a store are discourteous, people do not trade there except for the most compel-
ling reasons. The goods in a shop must be superlative in quality and almost
unobtainable elsewhere to attract customers in the face of discourtesy on the
part of management and salesmen. "The public be damned" is an impossible
premise for successful activity in this country, in purely procedural matters
as in substantive matters. It applies in business, in the professions, and with
equal force and weight in government.
Of course, I am not minimizing the vital value of substantive policy,
program and rulings. But we can put it down as a certainty that if the ad-
ministrative agencies, or an administrative agency, is defective in its adjective
aspects, or if it appears to be so, it is headed for public condemnation. Joe
Doaks comes before the agency for something and gets pushed around, or
forms a low opinion of the proceeding itself, and he is just as mad as he is
about an adverse decision; and usually he is much more vociferous about it.
He proceeds to tell all and sundry about what strikes him as not fair. If an
umpire "calls 'em quick and as he sees 'em," Joe may yell and gripe, but in
his heart, and when things get rough, he support that umpire. But if the
umpire delays and is generally inefficient in reaching a decision, Joe has no
use for him whatever, no matter if his decision is right. So I proceed from
the general premise that the procedural aspects of administrative action, the
same as any other action, are of prime importance-in fact vital.
I shall not attempt a list of our problems and shall mention only three.
The first is our professional craftsmanship as lawyers. By craftsmanship I
mean the ability to write pleadings and briefs, to examine witnesses, to cross
examine them, and to introduce testimony. The fact is that our profession as
a whole is woefully deficient in craftsmanship. We pay little or no attention
to it, either in our processes of education or in our practice. I would not over-
emphasize practice courses to the detriment of substantive law, but I do
think that we ought to teach law students not only how to write a will, or
a contract, but how to write one well. We teach them all the psychological
principles underlying judicial proof, but we ought also to teach them how to
ask questions, directly, succintly, and accurately. Hundreds of lawyers are
trying cases upon the general theory that anybody can try a lawsuit. The
result is that we take weeks to try issues when a few hours would readily
suffice. Justice often miscarries in such process. There is something to be
said for the British system of barristers. Francis Wellman says that an ex-
perienced trial lawyer will require at the utmost not more than a quarter of
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the time taken by the most learned inexperienced lawyer, and moreover will be
more likely to bring about an equitable verdict which may not be appealed
from at all, or, if appealed, will be sustained by a higher court. It is true.
Other professions pay great attention to craftsmanship. Doctors have
to undergo long internships before they are turned loose on the public.
Preachers have to preach sample sermons in the course of their education.
Engineers do not let a graduate fresh out of school go to building bridges and
structures without senior supervision, and the tests of their ability are prac-
tical tests. I truly believe that if we lawyers learned how to do most efficiently
the things we do, whether it is to write a contract, construct a bond issue,
draw a will, examine a witness, write a brief, or make an argument, the
administration of justice would achieve a major advance in this country-
perhaps even the critical advance necessary to the preservation of system.
We here are not interested in court trials. But the lack of craftsmanship,
so generally prevalent in our profession, is a. characteristic of our administra-
tive proceedings. And in those proceedings the need of skillful trial technique
is even more acute than in the courtroom. In the first place, the matters be-
ing handled are vastly more complicated than ordinary lawsuits. Hence a
mixup is worse, and the truth is harder to find. In the second place, the
administrative agency is promoted as an instrument of efficiency, and if it be
not efficient, public criticism comes quickly. When we as lawyers, by lack
of technical skill, so delay disposition of disputed cases as to prevent efficient
operation, we are threatening injury to' the system we ought on all accounts
to be protecting. And when I say "we lawyers" I mean attorneys in both
Government and private practice. In the third place, the ordinary rules, such
as the rules of evidence, or pleading and the like, which, whatever else is
said about them, certainly tend to keep a semblance of order, are relaxed.
The skill of counsel becomes one of the chief preventives of chaos.
May we be a little more specific and consider separately the phases of
our procedure in disputed cases? They are the presentation of direct evi-
dence, cross examination, a brief and an argument. The results of defective
craftsmanship in these matters are days and weeks of wasted time, volumes
upon volumes of records, dollars and dollars of expense, and total uncertainty
as to the outcome.
The difficulty in the presentation of direct evidence comes in major part
in the lack of preparation in the mechanics of the hearing. I sat once in an
administrative proceeding in which a young lawyer introduced over 200
photostats of individual letters, one at a time by individual identification by
a witness over a period of days, after opposing counsel had offered to stipu-
late the identification of the whole batch in a blanket stipulation. The young
lawyer said that he chose to try his case in his own way and would appreciate
no suggestions. On the other hand, I once looked with joy at a record where
counsel said to a witness, "You have prepared a study upon such-and-such a
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subject in relation to this company? Did you incorporate a narrative state-
ment explaining the computations? Do you adopt the statement and the
computations as your sworn testimony? Is this it? I offer this exhibit. Take
the witness." Copies of the study had long been furnished opposing counsel,
and cross examination could have proceeded at once and directly at the con-
troversial items in accordance with a well and carefully designed cross ex-
amination with a purpose. It is quite a chore to prepare adequately the pre-
sentation of direct testimony, but we ought to be required to do it. It is
amazing how quickly and how accurately a skillful examiner can draw a
word picture from a witness, even of a complicated subject.
I know that lawyers are trained to believe that questions and answers
on one small topic at a time constitute the only method of proceeding in a
formal hearing. I suggest to you that that may not be so in administrative
hearings. We are not before a jury or before a trial judge who must decide
the case largely upon what he hears and has not the time to analyze great
masses of evidence or to wait for such analyses. The examiner, or board, or
commission does not make findings from what he or it hears. The findings
are drawn from the formal written record. Our proceedings have three
essentials: First, all the evidence placed in a formal record; second, full
opportunity to dispute items of evidence by cross examination or by contra-
dictory evidence; and, third, an analysis and summary of the evidence, either
in the form of proposed findings or in the form of a statement of facts, so
that the formal evidence is accurately directed at the issues in dispute. Our
object is not to convince a listener, or to mold a decision instanter. Our object
is to convince reader and to shape a decision which will be fashioned from a
stenographic record and documentary exhibits in an unhurried analysis and
assembly. Our administrative hearings differ from the usual court proceedings
in these important characteristics. We ought to discard the mechanical limita-
tions of the one and design an efficient system of mechanics for our type of
proceeding. An administrative proceeding offers no prizes for histrionics, it is
the building of a wall, brick by brick.
One respect in which our presentation of evidence is particularly
deficient is our handling of voluminous statistical data. We have it in
exhibit form, and then we spend hours and days having a witness read long
figures into the stenographic record from the exhibit. I do not know the
best way to do it, but I do know that a well-prepared exhibit, plus a narra-
tive guide, either oral or written, showing how to find one's way through
the exhibit, is a completely sufficient method. I also know that the way we
generally do it now is an outrageous waste of time and money and the very
antithesis of efficiency. And I also know that if we tried we could devise
a method for handling such evidence efficiently and sensibly. The critical
feature of statistical data is. the summary linking it to the issues. Most of
the bulk of it is superfluous.
Another point at which our technique in the presentation of evidence
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is askew is in the proof of a scientific fact. We have many controversies over
scientific facts in administrative proceedings-wave lengths, car safety, elec-
tric energy, rate at which ice melts at certain temperatures, and innumerable
others. Our method of proof is for one side to employ an expert and have
him answer questions. Then the other side employs an expert who testifies
to the precise contrary of the first expert. And the same process repeats.
The examiner, or the commission, then does the best he or it can to figure the
truth from the direct contradictions. It does seem that in an age of compli-
cated scientific facts, with plenty of learned folk who know accurately and
fully what there is to know about these facts, the legal profession ought
to be able to devise some technique of proof which would insure that
decisions of disputed cases involving scientific facts or theories are upon
an accurate basis.
Although we are deficient in our craftsmanship on direct examination,
we are much more so on cross. A cross examination without plan or objec-
tive is not only useless but is a positive impediment to the administration of
justice. All of us have known so-called cross examinations to go on for days
and weeks when, as a matter of fact, nothing was occurring except an argu-
ment, more or less acrimonious, between witness and counsel. The practice
is so general as to be, in my opinion, a major problem. It exists both in
Government circles and at the private bar. I teach my class at Georgetown
that the rule as to cross examination of experts is "Don't", that there are a
few welldefined exceptions to that general rule, and that unless the situation
falls within one of those exceptions, they should not indulge in cross. Perhaps
the statement is too strong, but I believe it to be true.
The problem of cross examination is particularly acute in administrative
proceedings, because there we deal so much with experts in complicated
fields. I have never known an expert to change his view because of a cross
examination. I have never heard of one doing so. And Mr. Wellman says
one never does. A cross examination may serve to throw into relief the
weaknesses of his material, his knowledge or his reasoning, or it may supply
the basis for impeachment of his credibility but he will never change his
mind on the witness stand. Nevertheless, the great majority of lawyers go
into a cross examination with the idea that they can argue or harass an expert
into changing his answer. That is a complete waste of time. Of course,
before a jury, the passing impressions created by a great actor in cross
examining a witness may serve some useful purpose. But in the administra-
tive practice, we are addressing ourselves to a cold, impersonal stenographic
record, from which the examiner, or board, or commission will, in deliberate
fashion at some later time, extract the facts. It is poor craftsmanship and
a definite drag on the process of adjudication to indulge in cross examination
without a plan or definite purpose.
Just a word about craftsmanship in briefs and argument, although a full'
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evening could be devoted to the subject. Every disputed case consists of
issues. The agency or the court must decide those issues, and when the
issues are decided, the general result is automatic. Good craftsmanship on
the part of counsel in brief or argument consists of defining with precision
those issues, assembling the evidence pertinent to each, and then stating a
process of reasoning from the pertinent data to a conclusion. Do you think
that most of us follow that obvious procedure? We do not. Generally speak-
ing, we write, or worse yet merely dictate, a discussion of the case, a general
plea for justice, or mercy, an allegation in vehement terms that our opponent
is in error, and top it off with a few selected sentences torn bodily from all
context in some cases or textbooks. We make statements of points, such as
"The court erred in failing to grant a new trial" or "The commission erred
in finding a rate base of $10,000,000" or "The findings are without sub-
stantial evidence in support." When we make this last point, do you think
that, generally speaking, we lawyers assemble whatever evidence there was
in support of a given finding, then state what necessary evidence was lack,
ing, and then proceed in discernible thought processes to show that the evi-
dence present was not substantial in the absence of that which was lacking?
We do not. It is sad but nevertheless true that as a class we do not argue
cases. That is, we do not start with a stated material and proceed in some
ordered mental processes to a conclusion. We generally write and speak
discussions of the subject, treatises, or just plain pleas.
The second problem I submit to you as besetting the administrative prac-
tice is more difficult to state. Justice itself is substantive. But the adminis-
tration of justice is procedural. Americans have a definite conviction upon
that subject. It is not theoretical. It is composed of exceedingly simple,
practical elements. The essentials of the American concept of the adminis-
tration of justice ar" (1) that opportunity be afforded to present evide nce of
the facts, (2) that the facts be found exactly as they actually are, to the best
of our ability to ascertain them from the evidence, and (3) that the applicable
rules be applied, without deviation,. to the facts as found. It is just as simple
as that.
Much has been written and spoken to the general effect that administra-
tive agencies, or some of them, do not comply scrupulously with those simple
rules. It is said vigorously and repeatedly that some agencies find what facts
they please, on the barest shadow of evidence, and reach whatever conclusion
they have predetermined.
I have no word to say as to whether such allegations are or are not
true. My proposition is that the administrative agencies must comply with
those simple elements, and not only must they comply but it must be apparent
to all who see their work that they comply. It is necessary for the existence
of the agencies that they protect themselves, and that we, as practitioners
before them, protect them from any reputation of being arbitrary. The
course of any agency to the contrary is to the detriment of all agencies, and
of us.
Torches can properly be carried in the process of fixing policies and
programs, when substantive principles are being determined. Such principles
can be debated in the abstract and tested upon reason, or theory, or experience.
If an agency adopts erroneous principles or program, that is the concern of
the whole of the executive branch of the Government and of the Congress.
But on the other phase of administrative agency work, that is, in the appli-
cation of those principles to individuals, no torches can be carried. That is
where the greatest danger lies. The process of dealing with the individual
and his rights in a disputed matter must accord with the American concept
of the administration of justice.
In the first place, our whole concept of law is that reason should control
human conduct. Professor Thayer (3 Harv. L. Rev. 143; 4 id. 157) said it
thus, "But as we use the phrase 'trial' . .. now, we mean a rational ascertain-
ment of facts, and a rational ascertainment and application of rules. What
was formerly 'tried' by the method of force or the mechanical conformity
to form, is now 'tried' by the method of reason." In the second place, our
political concept as embodied in the Constitution is "due process of law." And
by that phrase we mean a process in which facts "are found as thcy are and
rules are applied to the facts :as thus found, with cold-blooded objectivity.
The proposition I have put can be conclusively demonstrated on either
of the two foregoing bases. But of still greater practical importance is the
fact that the public will not permit the continued existence of any agency
of government which in its estimation is not fair. That is just a simple
political fact. I put it as a scientific certainty that when the people of this
country become convinced that a given agency, or officer is arbitrary, or
unjust, or unfair, that agency or' person is doomed. Congress will surety
obliterate it. You can pick your own examples. Prohibition was perhaps
the outstanding one. The people did not repeal the 18th Amendment because
they wanted liquor back. They could have brought back such liquor as they
needed by some controlled method. They wiped the whole business out
because the enforcement of the law was so outrageous that gradually it
became a scandal. There are other instances where the substance of the
law is uncontroverted in excellence but the methods of enforcement have
led the people to destroy the whole business. You may think of examples
where the conviction got abroad, however, unjustly, that an agency did
not find the facts as they really were, or was not wholly objective in
applying the rules to the facts. Those instances stand as tragic warnings
against the appearance or the reputation of arbitrary action. On the other
hand are those agencies which have built up over the years reputations of
cold-blooded objectivity in disputed cases, and when the storms came and
beat about their heads, the public came to their support. When that hap-
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pened, hardly a corporal's guard was in the opposition when the issues were
drawn. You can hardly exaggerate the importance of a conviction on the
part of the whole public that when a dispute is submitted to a given board
or commission, no matter whether the parties be great or small, powerful
or important, the facts are found exactly as the evidence shows them to be
and the rules are applied to those facts with unvarying objectivity. The
validity of policies and programs can be discussed and debated upon a high
plane and with reasoning. They are political matters, or matters of sub-
stantive law. But the public will have no part of arbitrary administrative
action as it sees it. Its dealing in such instances is ruthless and oftentimes
tragic.
And to comply with the requirements is such a simple matter. Over and
over again we hear arguments and protestations about why a hearing was
not granted. In 25 years of administrative law, inside and outside the Gov-
ernment, I assure you that I have never heard a good reason for not having
a hearing in a dispute, and I have never known an instance in which any time
was saved by not giving a hearing.
The public mind is a strange instrument. The science of governmental
regulation and of law enforcement is a complicated and fascinating study.
Many characteristics of public thought which are dramatic and maybe
alarming, are superficial. For example, a mere gripe is not a real objection.
And pressure groups are often infinitesimal in public influence. But there
are certain fundamentals which are as invariable as scientific truths. People not
only do not relish unfair treatment for themselves, but they resent it for their
neighbor. And they not only resent such treatment against their neighbor,
but they resent it in his favor. If an American learns of a favor unjustly
bestowed upon another person, even one he does not know, he resents it in
the same sort of way he resents an unjust imposition on another person. The
essence of success in government regulation, or of any law enforcement, is
public approval of the conduct of the administrator. You cannot hire enou~gh
agents to enforce a law in this country, if the public does not approve that
enforcement. By approval I mean fundamental approval, not spasmodic or
vociferous acclamation. If the public does not approve, witnesses will not
cooperate, juries will not convict, observers will not report violations, and
every Tom, Dick and Harry will make a point of ignoring the law or regu-
lation just for the principle of the thing. And finally Congress gets around
to it. Therefore, wise regulation is based upon the simple conduct of cold-
blooded objectivity which creates a public confidence and approval, an un-
shakable rock upon which to stand. In and of itself, that approval results
in law observance.
I urge upon you the vital necessity of a rigid compliance by all adminis-
trative agencies of the simple and easy fundamentals of what the American
people consider the proper administration of law.
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The third problem which I should like to state is the necessity for a
proper coordination between the administrative and judicial functions in
these matters. I do not speak in favor of greater judicial' review. Neither do
I speak from the standpoint of the courts. I do not think that the courts
want to venture farther than necessary into the technical and complicated
questions which arise in the administrative field. I speak from the standpoint
of the agencies. The fact is that the public distrusts any officer or agent
who does not want his action to be subjected to scrutiny. I do not think it
an accident that the most reviewed of all administrative agencies, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, which deals with the most universally unpopular of
all subjects, taxes, has a place of unshakable stability in public estimation
and support, whereas agencies with more popular functions but which suc-
cessfully prevented provisions for review, have been shattered by storms.
There is a public confidence in the mere fact of the possibility-of review. Wis-
dom on the part of the agencies would dictate an insistence by them upon
the easy availability of judicial review to the extent necessary to prevent the
possibility of arbitrary or unjust action. An insurance for the people against
arbitrary action by the agencies is at the same time insurance for the agencies
against arbitrary action by the people. Of course, the problem has been
largely settled by the Administrative Procedure Act. My proposition is
that we ought to lay the debate to rest, for the greater benefit of the agencies
and the practioners before them.
And now where does all this leave us? Well, there are two methods-
of solving mutual problems upon which there are conflicting views. The first
we might call the antipathy method, or the ordeal by contact. Mostly we
have been following that method. On the one hand the bar has been crying
aloud that the agencies want to set up administrative obsolutism and to
destroy our system of government, to obliterate the rule of law. Well, I have
known a lot of administrators. One day Joe Doaks is practicing law like
the rest of us. The nex t day he is Mr. Commissioner, or Mr. General
Counsel. And the next day he is Joe Doaks again. He doesn't change so
very much in the process. One day he is whooping it up for his client, a
bricklayer, or a merchant, or a broadcasting company. The next day he is
whooping it up for his client, the Secretary of Agriculture or John Q.
Public. Of course, there are some crackpots in the agencies, about the same
proportion as there are at the bar, I think, or in any healthy community.
And there are some radicals who would like to tear down the whole struc-
ture, but again I think the proportion in the agencies is about the same as
that among members of the bar, or in a normal community. But neither the
crockvots nor the radicals are long-time major problems. Mostly the real
trouble is twofold. One is an excess of zealousness. It is a normal human
characteristic You never saw an expert on tuberculosis who didn't think
everybody had tuberculosis, or at least ought to be x-rayed for it; or a vege-
tarian who didn't think eating meat was a terrible evil. Specialists have enor-
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mous ideas on their respective subjects. The other trouble is that an expert
knows he knows more about his subject than does anybody else. If left
entirely alone, without supervision, he could handle that field to exquisite
perfection. And maybe he could.
At any rate, much of the bar is disturbed and curses roundly at the
agencies which contest any semblance of a check on their activities.
On the other hand, some agencies are vociferous in proclaiming that
the bar is unprincipled, and selfish to boot, and wants to interfere with the
efficiency of administrative action, to block dire unpleasantness to their clients.
To tell the truth, there is much basis for the charge. But it is not the utter
truth. The bar is conservative. It is the 'most jealous of all groups in protection
of those rights spelled out over the centuries in the people's struggle against
governmental tyranny. But mostly the trouble is that the lawyers seldom
get together on a non-client basis and approach a problem in the detached
viewpoint of which they are capable.
On the whole, the solution of mutual problems by non-cooperative anti-
pathy gets exactly nowhere.
The other method we might call the cooperative approach. It has
been tried with tremendous success in other fields of the administration of
justice. Every federal circuit now has an annual conference of judges and
lawyers for the discussion of mutual problems. There is a committee in
every state, sponsored by the American Bar Association, for the improvement
of the administration of justice, and composed of judges and lawyers. Chief
Justice Laws is chairman of that committee in the District of Columbia, and
he has recently added laymen to the group. I well remember the pleasure
everyone involved received from mutual conferences on procedure between
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and th American Bar Committee on Taxa-
tion. I also remember what mutual benefit followed when our local Public
Utilities Commission called in representatives of the local bar to assist in the
preparation of rules for its procedure. I believe that the Interstate Commerce
Commission did the same thing. The new Federal Rules of Civil and
Criminal Procedure were drafted largely by practitioners at the bar.
What have we here? On the one side, all, or almost all, the federal
administrative agencies are here in Washington. On the other hand, in this
Association are practitioners who are specialists in practice before every
agency. All these people live here. They do not have to be assembled from
vast distances or confer by correspondence.
What could they do? I am not going to suggest. If enough of you are
interested in the matter to take it up, you will think of plenty of things. If
you are not interested, nothing will be done anyhow. But I don't mind
supposing a little.
Suppose, first of all, that we could coordinate the thought and experience
of all the agencies, and of all the various sorts of specialty practitioners, not
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with the idea of producing a uniform system of procedure necessarily, but
with the idea of improving the procedure of each by composite suggestions
of all.
Suppose a joint conference were arranged as an annual event, composed
of representatives of all the agencies, or such of them as wanted to join in,
and a selected group of delegates from this Section, for the joint consideration
of problems in administrative procedure?
Or suppose the Attorney General- here should institute such an adminis-
trative conference, and invite the bar to participate, as the Judicial Con-
ferences do?
Or suppose a joint committee were established, composed of fifteen or
twenty of the general counsel of the agencies and their representatives, and
the same number of practitioners, the function of the committee being to
formulate recommendations for the improvement of administrative procedure?
Now that I come to think of it, it wouldn't be such a bad idea if Attor-
ney General Clark were to institute as a permanent organization an Attorney
General's Committee on the Improvement of Administrative Procedure.
Or suppose the American Bar Association put its weight behind such
a program and sponsored a committee to be operated by this Section, or in
cooperation with this Section?
How would such efforts be started? I suppose by the appointment of
a committee of this Section to wait on the Attorney General and the several
agencies; or upon the heads of the American Bar Association.
Or suppose this Section prepared and published a book or series of
pamphlets, done with great care, and the cooperation of invited participants
from the agencies, on the practical features of administrative procedure and
its peculiarities? "How to prepare an administrative case for trial," "How
to ask questions on direct," "When and how to cross examine," "How to
get a document into a record," How to handle statistical information,"
and so on.
Or suppose this Section instituted a seminar to be held every year with
experiment practitioners to lecture on and demonstrate the purely practical
side of procedure?
Is all this too ambitious a program? Maybe so, but these are big issues
and this is an able body of men
REMINDER TO ALL MEMBERS of the Denver and Colorado
Bar Associations:
The annual Colorado Bar Association Convention will be held at the
Broadmoor, October 14 and 15. Plan to attend, as a very interesting, edu-
cational and entertaining program has been arranged.
